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MY LAWYER WENT TO COURT AND ALL I GOT WAS THIS
LOUSY COUPON! THE CLASS ACTION FAIRNESS ACT’S
INADEQUATE PROVISION FOR JUDICIAL SCRUTINY OVER
PROPOSED COUPON SETTLEMENTS
J. Brendan Day ∗
Craig Martin buys a brand new car, complete with the latest edition of
Firestone all-weather tires. Months later, Craig reads in the newspaper that a
class action lawsuit has been filed against Firestone on behalf of fifteen million
tire purchasers, alleging that the manufacturer’s latest tire rollout had been
defectively designed and now poses a significant hazard to consumers.
Months later, Craig receives a confusing postcard. This postcard informs him
that the case has been settled, and if he has an original receipt of his tire purchase, he may apply online within the next month for a coupon good for a ten
dollar rebate from his next in-store purchase of Firestone tires, something he has
no interest in. His right to sue Firestone independently has been automatically
waived. He later learns that his attorney, whom he has never met, spoken to,
or heard from, has earned nineteen million dollars from the settlement. Craig
Martin now has a set of potentially deadly tires, a complicated set of directions
to recoup ten dollars from the cost of the expensive replacement tires that he
must now buy, and the infuriating realization that his “advocate” has walked
1
away with a windfall.
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1
This account is a fictional example adapted from an actual case, Shields v.
Bridgestone/Firestone Inc., No. E-0167637 (Tex. Dist. Ct. July 31, 2002). See infra notes
135, 278–86 and accompanying text.
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INTRODUCTION

Congress enacted the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA)
primarily to expand federal jurisdiction over multi-state class action
lawsuits and to limit unfair class action practices that inflicted con2
centrated damage upon absent class members. By passing CAFA,
Congress purportedly desired to “assure fair and prompt recoveries
3
for class members with legitimate claims,” to restore the constitutional intent of the framers to provide for “[f]ederal court consideration of interstate cases of national importance under diversity juris4
diction,” and to “benefit society by encouraging innovation and
5
lowering consumer prices.”
CAFA covers a broad spectrum of issues designed to promote efficiency and uphold fairness of class action litigation, as a result of
specific congressional findings that “abuses of the class action device
6
have harmed class members with legitimate claims,” and have “un7
dermined public respect for the [American] judicial system” by
8
awarding class counsel large fees, “while leaving class members with
9
. . . little or no” meaningful compensation for their alleged injuries.
10
One such abuse, demonstrated above, commonly occurs in the form
of “coupon settlements,” whereby class counsel and defendants agree
to distribute to class members coupons, discounts, or credits on a
11
product or service offered by the defendants in lieu of a cash award.
Attorneys representing the class, on the other hand, receive attorney’s fees in cash, based on a percentage of the aggregate face value
12
of the coupon settlement. The coupon settlement innovation is justifiably a cause for concern—the very party accused of legal transgressions stands to benefit (perhaps even profit) from increased sales,

2

John F. Harris, Victory for Bush on Suits: New Law to Limit Class-Action Cases,
WASH. POST, Feb. 18, 2005, at A1.
3
Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 2(b)(1), 119 Stat. 4, 5
(2005).
4
Id. § 2(b)(2).
5
Id. § 2(b)(3).
6
Id. § 2(a)(2)(A).
7
Id. § 2(a)(2)(C).
8
Id. § 2(a)(3)(A).
9
Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 2(a)(3)(A), 119 Stat. 4,
5 (2005).
10
See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
11
Steven B. Hantler & Robert E. Norton, Coupon Settlements: The Emperor’s Clothes
of Class Actions, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1343, 1344 (2005).
12
Id. Valuation of coupon settlements and the attorney’s fees tied to them are a
major focus of CAFA, and will be discussed more thoroughly in Parts III and IV, infra.
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while class members, allegedly harmed by the defendant, continue to
13
be inexorably tethered to the defendant.
To ameliorate the fundamentally unfair coupon settlement prac14
tices that pierced the class action landscape upon the genesis of
15
coupon settlements in the early 1990s, Congress ratified a “Con16
sumer Class Action Bill of Rights” within CAFA, which created the
central mechanism designed to correct the Coupon Settlement Prob17
lem (as well as other settlement process issues). The primary objective of the Consumer Class Action Bill of Rights is to limit the exorbitant fees class counsel were obtaining from coupon settlements by
mandating that fees be calculated on a basis commensurate with the
18
actual value of the proposed settlement. Specifically, the Act directs
that fees be based on the value of coupons that are actually redeemed, and not the theoretical face value of the aggregate coupon
offering in which a significant number of absent class members are
19
unlikely ever to acquire.
CAFA endeavors to solve the Coupon Settlement Problem by
implementing a market mechanism designed to provide incentives to
attorneys to increase the value of individual coupons in a proposed
settlement (thus increasing the amount of redeemed coupons and, in
20
turn, attorney’s fees). Unfortunately, this solution is unlikely to be
effective. As this Comment argues, the Act’s attorney’s fees provisions are far from airtight and are susceptible to lawyerly circumven21
tion. Additionally, this Comment contends that CAFA’s judicial re13

WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, UNDERSTANDING THE CLASS ACTION FAIRNESS ACT OF
2005, at 10 (2005), available at http://www.classactionprofessor.com/cafa-analysis.
pdf; see also The Use of “Coupon” Compensation and Other Non-Pecuniary Redress, 18 GEO.
J. LEGAL ETHICS 1161, 1168 (2005) [hereinafter FTC Workshop].
14
This Comment refers to the issue presented by unfair coupon settlements as
the “Coupon Settlement Problem.”
15
See Hantler & Norton, supra note 11, at 1344; see also Analysis: Class Action Litigation—A Federalist Society Survey, Part II, CLASS ACTION WATCH, Spring 1999, at 5–12,
available at http://www.fed-soc.org/doclib/20070321_classaction12.pdf (detailing
survey of generally perceived increases in class action litigation during the 1990s).
16
Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 § 3(a), 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1711–1715 (West
2007). Section 3 of CAFA amends Title 28 of the United States Code by inserting §§
1711–1715. The focus of this Comment is on § 1712, which deals with coupon settlements in general. To a more specific level, this Comment scrutinizes § 1712(e),
dealing with judicial scrutiny of proposed coupon settlements. See infra Parts III.B
and IV.B.
17
Rubenstein, supra note 13, at 10.
18
Id. at 11.
19
Id.
20
28 U.S.C.A. § 1712(a)–(e).
21
See infra Part IV.A.
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view guideline, which professes to direct the court in its assessment of
a proposed coupon settlement, provides an insufficient backstop for
22
A district judge may only approve a
unfair settlement proposals.
coupon settlement upon a written finding that it is “fair, reasonable,
23
and adequate for class members.” This scrutiny standard is virtually
identical to the language of Rule 23(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, which calls for a fairness hearing before a proposed class
24
action settlement can be approved. However, because trial judges
regularly approved unfair coupon settlements prior to the enactment
25
of CAFA, there is no reason to believe that the substantively identical review standard will prevent the qualification of similarly inequitable settlement proposals. Additionally, CAFA’s jurisdictional expansion principles will transfer even more class action cases in which
26
a coupon settlement is proposed into federal courts, further increasing the likelihood of federal court approval of iniquitous coupon settlements.
This Comment asserts that in the coupon settlement context,
CAFA’s judicial scrutiny provision provides substandard protection to
class members given the history of fundamentally unfair awards to

22

See infra Part IV.B.
28 U.S.C.A. § 1712(e).
24
See infra Parts III, IV. The only difference between the two standards is that
CAFA mandates the finding be in writing. Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e), with 28
U.S.C.A. § 1712(e).
25
Carole J. Buckner, Due Process in Class Arbitration, 58 FLA. L. REV. 185, 200
(2006) (stating that “courts often give settlements only a perfunctory review, resulting in inadequate protection of absent class members’ interests”); see also Linda S.
Mullenix, Taking Adequacy Seriously: The Inadequate Assessment of Adequacy in Litigation
and Settlement Classes, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1687, 1692 (2004). Professor Mullenix states:
[C]ourts pay lip service to the concept of adequate representation but
fail to robustly engage in any meaningful inquiry to establish the existence of such adequate representation. For judges, the adequacy inquiry usually is the least-rigorously examined requirement for certification, either for litigation or for settlement classes. Instead, courts
routinely wave their blessings over class counsel and proposed class
representatives and presumptively make findings of adequacy on nonexistent or scant factual showings.
Id. This argument can plausibly be extended to the adequacy review of proposed settlements. See infra Parts III.A and IV.B.
26
See Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 §§ 4–5, 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1332(d), 1453
(West 2007). The expansion of federal court jurisdiction over multi-state class actions is relevant to this Comment insofar as the number of class actions that were
previously filed in state court before the passage of CAFA will now be scrutinized by
federal courts. Thus, a description of CAFA’s jurisdictional provisions is provided in
Part II.A, infra.
23
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27

those absent litigants. By focusing almost exclusively on attorney’s
28
fees, Congress ignored the fact that there is no indication that restraining excessive fees necessarily precludes class counsel and defendants from agreeing on a mutually beneficial bargain that hurts
absent class members. While the Act may or may not effectively limit
excessive attorney’s fees, it does little with respect to substantive protections for absent class members. Given those flaws, the Act should
have incorporated a more exacting standard of settlement review.
This Comment argues that, as codified, CAFA’s judicial review standard lacks the foundation to mount an adequate second line of defense. Hence, CAFA is incapable of achieving its stated objectives.
Because the judicial scrutiny standard provided in CAFA does
not adequately protect absent class members where a coupon settlement is proposed, the Act should be amended. An amendment to
CAFA providing district judges with a test that presumptively invalidates all coupon settlements would realistically enable the Act to filter
out the substantively harmful settlement proposals, thus restoring
29
fundamental fairness to the class action system.
This Comment proceeds in four parts. Part II describes the class
action mechanism and discusses the Coupon Settlement Problem by
exploring attorneys’ inherent economic incentives that give rise to
the problem, as well as judicial review over class action settlement
proposals. Part II also demonstrates the Coupon Settlement Problem
by providing specific examples of coupon settlements that have undermined the interests of absent class members.
Part III discusses CAFA’s relevant provisions and how the Act attempts to solve the Coupon Settlement Problem. Particularly, Part III
fleshes out the statutory device designed to provide relief to absent
class members by tying attorney’s fees to a more realistic valuation of
the proposed coupon settlement. In addition, Part III outlines
CAFA’s jurisdictional rule changes for interstate class actions. Finally,
this Part explicates the Act’s judicial scrutiny provision devised as a
supervisory instrument to ensure sufficient relief to absent class members.
Part IV examines why CAFA, as written, does not provide satisfactory protection for absent class members. Due to the inadequate
oversight provision in the legislation, reviewing judges are just as apt
27

See John H. Beisner, Matthew Shors & Jessica Davidson Miller, Class Action
“Cops”: Public Servants or Private Entrepreneurs?, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1441, 1446–50 (2006)
(reviewing historical inequities of various coupon settlement proposals).
28
See Rubenstein, supra note 13, at 11.
29
See infra Part V.A.
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to rubber-stamp a substantively unfair coupon settlement proposal as
they were before CAFA was enacted. This section supports this contention by elucidating a number of theoretical and practical concerns
with the Act’s judicial scrutiny standard, as well as CAFA’s fees-related
provisions. Part IV concludes by arguing that because CAFA is unable to ensure truly valuable relief to injured class members, the Act
should be amended to empower the legislation that is, at least in theory, beneficial to the individuals who are most in need of judicial protection.
Finally, Part V proposes and explains an amendment to CAFA
that would best rectify the Act’s shortcomings. Specifically, Part V argues that the Act should be amended to include a strong yet rebuttable presumption against all proposed coupon settlements. Pursuant to this proposed amendment, a judge should allow the settlement
to proceed only upon a collective showing by class counsel and defendants that there is a bona fide rationale for structuring a particular settlement to include coupons instead of cash, and that such a
proposal does in fact provide substantive value to class members
30
commensurate with their alleged injuries. By constructing a more
restrictive judicial filter, the Act would better accomplish the goals it
seeks to attain. Part V also briefly spells out several competing theories on how best to perfect CAFA’s coupon provisions, and argues
why a rebuttable presumption against all proposed coupon settlements would best revamp the legislation’s deficiencies.
II. CLASS ACTIONS AND THE COUPON SETTLEMENT PROBLEM
A. The Class Action Device
Simply stated, class actions are representative, large-scale lawsuits
in which the rights of many people are adjudicated in a single pro31
ceeding. They function to protect defendants from inconsistent judicial obligations, to protect the interests of absentee litigants, to provide “a convenient and economical means for disposing of similar
lawsuits,” and to facilitate “the spreading of litigation costs among
32
numerous litigants with similar claims.” In order to understand the
full dimensions of the Coupon Settlement Problem, it is necessary to
first explore the roles of the stakeholders in class action litigation.

30
31
32

See infra Part V.A.
Rubenstein, supra note 13, at 2.
U.S. Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 403 (1980).
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Since 1966, Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure has
33
governed federal class action litigation. The rule “permits singleaction litigation of multiple claims involving similar or identical
questions of law and fact that arise from a common set of operative
facts. . . . [It] constitutes an exception to the usual rule that litigation
34
is conducted by, on behalf of, or against the named parties only.”
Class actions benefit plaintiffs because collective litigation of a large
number of common claims “afford aggrieved persons a remedy when
it is not economically feasible to obtain relief through the traditional
framework of multiple individual damage actions as, for example,
35
when each claim involves only a small dollar amount.” On the other
hand, defendants view class action litigation as a means of
“provid[ing] a single proceeding in which to determine the merits of
the plaintiffs’ claims and . . . [as] protect[ion] . . . from repeated and
36
potentially inconsistent adjudications.”
Because absent class members do not play a direct participatory
role in the representative litigation, Rule 23 sets forth stringent
guidelines for whether and when a complaint may be certified as a
class action so as to ensure that absent class members’ best interests
37
are protected. The rule “attempts to balance judicial efficiency of
litigation by or against classes against fairness and due process concerns, and does so by providing procedures and safeguards designed
to ensure fair and adequate protection of the interests of absentee
33

FED. R. CIV. P. 23; see also Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 613
(1997) (explaining the “innovative” revisions of the class action mechanism); see generally Benjamin Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (I), 81 HARV. L. REV. 356, 375–400 (1967) (summarizing
and commenting on the 1966 amendments to the Rules).
34
5 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 23.02 (3d ed. 1998)
(citing Gen. Tel. Co. of the Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 159 (1982); Am. Pipe &
Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 553 (1974); Eyak Native Vill. v. Exxon Corp., 25
F.3d 773, 781 (9th Cir. 1994)).
35
Id. (quoting Deposit Guar. Nat’l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 339 (1980)
(“Where it is not economically feasible to obtain relief within the traditional framework of a multiplicity of small individual suits for damages, aggrieved persons may be
without any effective redress unless they may employ the class action device.”)).
36
Id. (quoting Geraghty, 445 U.S. at 402–03 (“The justifications that led to the development of the class action include the protection of the defendant from inconsistent obligations . . . .”); First Fed. Bank v. Barrow, 878 F.2d 912, 919 (6th Cir. 1989)
(“The absence of class certification in the instant case would have precipitated a multitude of separate actions against the individual members of the certified classes
which would have created the risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications . . . which,
in turn, would have established incompatible standards of conduct for the trustee.”)).
37
See FED. R. CIV. P. 23; FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s notes (1966
amendment).
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38

class members.” The threshold requirements of Rule 23 are found
39
in subdivision (a). In order for any class to be certified, the rule
mandates that four necessary conditions be met: numerosity of plain40
tiffs so as to render joinder impracticable, commonality of questions
41
of law or fact with respect to the entire class, typicality of class mem42
bers’ claims, and adequate class representation so as to protect ab43
sent class members’ interests. Once the conditions of Rule 23(a)
have been fulfilled, a court may certify a class pursuant to one of
three categories before progressing further into the settlement nego44
tiation and trial phases.
As an essential part of determining whether a class should be
certified under Rule 23(a), the court must carefully scrutinize the
45
adequacy of the counsel who will represent the class. Because of the
38

5 MOORE ET AL., supra note 34, ¶ 23.02 (citing Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32,
42–43 (1940) (due process requires that interests of absent party be protected)).
39
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a).
40
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(1).
41
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2).
42
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(3).
43
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4).
44
Rule 23(b) sets forth three categories of class actions which may be certified,
conditioned upon the satisfaction of Rule 23(a). FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b). Rule
23(b)(1) applies “if individual actions would create a risk of mandating that the defendant engage in incompatible conduct, or would as a practical matter substantially
impair the interests of other identically situated class members.” Jon Romberg, Half
a Loaf Is Predominant and Superior to None: Class Certification of Particular Issues Under
Rule 23(c)(4)(A), 2002 UTAH L. REV. 249, 259 (2002); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1).
Rule 23(b)(2) applies when “the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act
on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a
whole . . . .” FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2). Finally, Rule 23(b)(3) applies when “the court
finds that the questions of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is
superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.” FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3); see also Romberg, supra, at 258–61 (discussing
Rule 23 generally). Subdivisions (b)(1) and (b)(2) are somewhat extraneous to the
focus of this Comment. (Injunctive relief may come with a proposed issuance of
coupons, making a proposed settlement more palatable; however, the focus here is
on the substitution of coupons in place of cash.) Because Rule 23(b)(3) centers
around the award of money damages, it provides the ideal backdrop for analysis of
settlements that include the substitution of coupon distributions instead of cash
awards to absent class members. Thus, in order to focus on post-certification issues
(as opposed to various topics involved with whether an action should be certified at
all), and for simplification, this Comment proceeds upon the presumptions that the
class actions at issue: (1) have been certified by a federal district court, or would have
been had they not been filed in state court; and (2) have been certified pursuant to
Rule 23(b)(3) in a federal district court, or would have been had they not been filed
in state court.
45
5 MOORE ET AL., supra note 34, ¶ 23.01.
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inherent ability of class counsel to effectively collude with the defendants to arrange a settlement optimally suited to each other’s interests at the expense of absent class members without a seat at the
bargaining table, a judge should be careful to “ensure that the . . .
class counsel will represent [the] class . . . fairly, adequately[,] and ef47
ficiently.”
However, ensuring this is easier said than done. Of particular
relevance to the Coupon Settlement Problem is the perverse incentive structure attorneys face in pursuing damages on behalf of absent
48
class members. While class action attorneys have been beneficently
labeled “private attorneys general” to describe their theoretical ability
to ensure adequate statutory enforcement, they have simultaneously
49
been criticized as “bounty hunters.” In a seminal attorney’s fees article, Professor John Coffee has argued that the economic incentives
for attorneys generate the disparate impact that class action settle50
ments tend to have on absent class members. The structural reality
that the lawyer “is unconstrained by the dictates or interests of a specific client” reinforces the disharmony between the incentives of ab51
sent class members and their representative in court. A number of
the resulting effects of this practical inability of absent class members
to influence the litigation highlight the economic incentive prob52
lem.
First, because they have a larger economic stake in the litigation
than any individual class member, attorneys become more risk averse
than the absent class members they represent, increasing the likeli53
hood of accepting a substantively inadequate settlement. Moreover,
this risk aversion entices class action attorneys to file a high volume of
cases, thereby spreading risk and decreasing the time and effort the
54
attorney is willing or able to devote to any one action. This also
55
tends to result in inadequate relief to aggrieved class members.
46

See, e.g., Susan P. Koniak, Feasting While the Widow Weeps: Georgine v. Amchem
Prods., Inc., 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1045, 1050 (1995) (arguing that defendants “bought
off class counsel and other plaintiffs’ lawyers”).
47
5 MOORE ET AL., supra note 34, ¶ 23.01; see also infra notes 69–77 and accompanying text.
48
See John C. Coffee, Jr., Rescuing the Private Attorney General: Why the Model of the
Lawyer as Bounty Hunter Is Not Working, 42 MD. L. REV. 215, 236–61 (1983).
49
Id. at 218.
50
Id. at 284.
51
Id. at 229.
52
See id. at 230–35.
53
Id. at 230–32.
54
Coffee, supra note 48, at 230–32.
55
Id.
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Second, counsel autonomy significantly increases the risk of col56
lusion between lawyer and defendant.
For example, a selfinterested attorney would prefer a $500,000 settlement with a fee of
57
$300,000 over a settlement of $1,000,000 with a fee of $200,000.
Knowing this, defendants are, of course, willing to exploit the attorney’s self-interest by settling for a lesser total dollar amount with a
58
higher percentage going to the class advocate. Coffee asserts that:
The possibility of collusive settlements grows in direct proportion
to the attorney’s “independence” from his client. The naked self
interest of the bounty hunter lies in his fee, not the recovery to
the class. As others have said many times, the parties can find a
variety of means by which to trade a low settlement for a high attorney’s fee, once the client becomes only a distant bystander to
the litigation. To say this is not to claim that plaintiffs’ attorneys
systematically subordinate the class recovery to their own fee, but
it is to say that the plaintiff’s attorney is subject to a serious conflict of interest—one that can distort the settlement process and
59
reduce the deterrent effect of private litigation . . . .

Third, the complete absence of a vested property right for attorneys who institute class action litigation creates a collective action
60
problem. Other potential advocates for the class are easily attracted
61
to free-ride on the instituting attorney’s diligence. As a result, that
attorney has no incentive to expend the “same effort in search and
discovery as [he] would if [he] could be assured of the ability to reap
62
the full economic return” of filing a successful class action. Again,
this leads to an increased tendency to accept a less than optimal rem63
edy for absent class members.
The disparity between the motivations of absent class members
and class counsel underlies the historic abuse of absent class mem64
bers. As the economic incentives of class action lawyers and their
clients diverge, self-interest heavily influences settlement practices,
resulting in a “nonzero-sum game” where adversaries (i.e., defendants
and class counsel) can structure a solution to their respective bene-

56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64

Id. at 232–33.
Id. at 243.
Id.
Id. at 232–33.
Coffee, supra note 48, at 233.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See infra Part II.B.
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65

fit. Unfortunately, absent class members normally bear the brunt of
this incentive structure. Settlement practices “end[] not with the
bang of victory or defeat, but only the whimper of dubious settlements,” which quite often includes inadequate compensation for in66
jured class members. As Professor Susan Koniak asserts, class counsel are “quite capable of talking themselves into believing that a deal
promising them a sure and hefty fee also does right by the class, however much a disinterested observer in possession of all the facts would
67
think the class had been seriously short-changed.” As this Comment
argues, more aggressive steps must be taken to prevent these external
motivations from driving the substantive remedy available to absent
68
class members.
Finally, of central importance to the issues discussed in this
Comment is the background practice of judicial supervision over class
action settlements. As a practical matter, class action lawsuits rarely
69
go to trial. While some are dismissed on legal motion, the vast ma70
jority are settled. Rule 23(e) mandates that before going into effect,
agreed-upon settlements are subject to a fairness review hearing conducted by the trial judge to ensure that the settlement proposal provides for “fair, reasonable, and adequate” relief for all parties to the
71
action. In the 1966 revisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Advisory Committee gave little guidance on the application
of Rule 23(e), merely “restat[ing] the rule’s instruction without
elaboration: ‘Subdivision (e) requires approval of the court . . . for
65

Coffee, supra note 48, at 244–45.
Id.
67
Susan P. Koniak, How Like a Winter? The Plight of Absent Class Members Denied
Adequate Representation, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1787, 1798 (2004).
68
See infra Parts IV.B, V.A.
69
Stephen Shapiro, Restrictions on Class Action Settlement Agreements, 12 IUS
GENTIUM 175, 175–76 (2006).
70
Id.
71
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e). Rule 23(e) provides in pertinent part:
[C]laims, issues, or defenses of a certified class may be settled, voluntarily dismissed, or compromised only with the court’s approval. The
following procedures apply to a proposed settlement, voluntary dismissal, or compromise: (1) The court must direct notice in a reasonable manner to all class members who would be bound by a proposed
settlement, voluntary dismissal, or compromise; (2) If the proposal
would bind class members, the court may approve it only after a hearing and on finding that it is fair, reasonable, and adequate.
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e). The remaining subparagraphs of Rule 23(e) are largely outside the scope of this Comment. They deal mostly with disclosure of agreements relating to the proposed settlements, exclusion opportunities for individual class
members, and objections to the proposed settlement by individual class members.
Id.
66
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the dismissal or compromise of any class action.’” This lack of guidance has translated into decades of judicial interpretation of “fair,
73
reasonable, and adequate,” and forms the primary basis for this
Comment—the context-specific interpretation of CAFA’s judicial
scrutiny over proposed coupon settlements.
A number of courts have attempted to explicate exactly what
level of scrutiny a judge should maintain when reviewing a proposed
74
settlement. Judge Posner writes that Rule 23(e)
requires district judges to exercise the highest degree of vigilance
in scrutinizing proposed settlements of class actions. We and
other courts have gone so far as to term the district judge in the
settlement phase of a class action suit a fiduciary of the class, who
is subject therefore to the high duty of care that the law requires
75
of fiduciaries.

Notwithstanding this theoretically strong judicial review directive,
significant concerns exist regarding improper qualification of pro76
posed settlements. One critic argues that “judicial review of a proposed . . . settlement provides insufficient protection to the class . . . .
[J]udges approve . . . settlements even while admitting that the settlement[s] . . . ‘do not provide plaintiffs substantial monetary
77
relief.’”

72

Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997) (citing FED. R. CIV.
P. 23(e) advisory committee’s note).
73
See, e.g., Reynolds v. Benefit Nat’l Bank, 288 F.3d 277, 279 (7th Cir. 2002);
Culver v. City of Milwaukee, 277 F.3d 908, 915 (7th Cir. 2002); In re Cendant Corp.
Litig., 264 F.3d 201, 231 (3d Cir. 2001); Maywalt v. Parker & Parsley Petroleum Co.,
67 F.3d 1072, 1079 (2d Cir. 1995); Grant v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 823 F.2d 20, 22–
23 (2d Cir. 1987). Part IV, infra, relates applications of Rule 23(e)’s standard of review to the coupon settlement context and argues that the rule provides substandard
assurance of relief for class members.
74
See, e.g., Culver, 277 F.3d at 915 (fiduciary duty of district judge to class is nondelegable); Grant, 823 F.2d at 22 (citing In re Warner Commc’ns Sec. Litig., 798 F.2d
35, 37 (2d Cir. 1986)) (“In approving a proposed class action settlement, the district
court has a fiduciary responsibility to ensure that the settlement is fair and not a
product of collusion, and that the class members’ interests were represented adequately.”) (internal quotations omitted); Stewart v. Gen. Motors Corp., 756 F.2d
1285, 1293 (7th Cir. 1985) (judge has fiduciary duty to class and motions to substitute counsel must be closely scrutinized).
75
Reynolds, 288 F.3d at 279–80.
76
See Christopher R. Leslie, A Market-Based Approach to Coupon Settlements in Antitrust and Consumer Class Action Litigation, 49 UCLA L. REV. 991, 1070 (2002). Professor Leslie’s argument, while specific to the coupon settlement context, id., can be
logically extrapolated to reveal a larger problem with the current state of judicial review over class action settlements.
77
Id.
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Other scholars support this contention. One commentator asserts that “[p]rocedural rules, such as the requirements for notice
and judicial approval of settlements, provide only a weak bulwark
79
against self-dealing and collusion.” Another maintains that “[t]he
trial court’s approval is a weak reed on which to rely once the adversaries have linked arms and approached the court in a solid phalanx
80
seeking its approval.”
The mechanics of settlement and review also play a considerable
role in improper approval of bad settlements under Rule 23(e). Professor Koniak claims that because only defendants and counsel for
the plaintiff class are seated at the bargaining table, the judge is not
privy to the give and take of settlement negotiation, and is
thus at a distinct disadvantage . . . . [The judge] has no reliable
way to discern in which nook or cranny . . . evidence of collusion
may lie. She may not even know what she should be looking
for . . . . By and large she knows just what she is told. And the
telling is not done by adversaries presenting clashing views on the
settlement’s fairness or the adequacy of the representation provided [but by both class counsel and defendant, who are in explicit agreement] . . . . So all most judges hear is a one-sided
presentation about how wonderful the settlement is and how aggressively class counsel championed the absent class’s cause. . . .
Judges, honest as they may be and diligently as most may work,
have an interest in settling any and all cases, and an even bigger
81
interest in seeing large and cumbersome class actions settle.

Indeed, even Judge Friendly, the renowned Second Circuit jurist, acknowledged that once the central players in a class action have
agreed on a settlement, “[a]ll the dynamics conduce to judicial ap82
proval of such settlements.”
The background issues discussed in this section frame the Coupon Settlement Problem. Specifically, the class action mechanism

78

See DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET AL., CLASS ACTION DILEMMAS: PURSUING PUBLIC
GOALS FOR PRIVATE GAIN 27, 488, 545 (2000); John C. Coffee, Jr., The Unfaithful Champion: The Plaintiff as Monitor in Shareholder Litigation, 48 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 70
(1985) (reiterating argument that stricter judicial review should be implemented
over nonpecuniary settlements in securities class actions).
79
HENSLER ET AL., supra note 78, at 120.
80
Coffee, supra note 78, at 26–27.
81
Koniak, supra note 67, at 1797–98 (internal citations omitted). The reality that
a reviewing judge is at a disadvantage in smoking out inequitable coupon settlements
provides a strong justification for a presumption against all coupon settlements. See
infra Part V.A.
82
Alleghany Corp. v. Kirby, 333 F.2d 327, 347 (2d Cir. 1964) (Friendly, J., dissenting).
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can and should be used to resolve large-scale litigation concerns that
83
otherwise could not be addressed through individual actions. The
baseline incentives, however, for the attorney representing the class
84
are inherently out of line with those of the absentee litigants. This
influences proposed settlements that can award starkly disproportionate relief to the attorney over absent class members. Additionally,
the ambiguity of Rule 23(e) and the actual procedures of settlement
negotiation hinder the reviewing judge’s ability to identify collusive
85
inequities contained in the proposed settlement. This results in the
fundamental flaw addressed in this Comment—the improper ratification of unfair coupon settlements.
B. The Coupon Settlement Problem
When used correctly, class actions can effectively kill three birds
with one procedural stone: they can serve to efficiently compensate a
vast number of plaintiffs who otherwise would not have been able to
litigate legitimate claims due to prohibitive economies of scale; they
allow defendants to rest easy with the knowledge that any and all
claims against them will be resolved in one action; and they relieve
86
However, as sophisticourts of the “flood of duplicative claims.”
cated defendants and class counsel gained experience in class action
litigation, the laudable goals of Rule 23 seemed to be lost amongst
87
the widespread public scorn for class actions.
One such abuse, repeatedly decried as the class action equivalent to squeegee boys splashing water on a clean windshield expect88
ing to get paid for a problem they created, is the coupon settlement.
In such an agreement, defendants agree to compensate class members solely through the provision of coupons, or other promises for
discounts on future purchases of the company’s products or ser89
vices. Historically, very few of these coupons are redeemed, and, as
discussed below, those that are redeemed are often of less actual

83

See supra notes 31–47 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 48–68 and accompanying text.
85
See supra notes 69–82 and accompanying text.
86
Hantler & Norton, supra note 11, at 1343.
87
See, e.g., Darryl Haralson & Adrienne Lewis, USA Today Snapshots: Opinions on
Class-Action Lawsuits, USA TODAY, Mar. 24, 2003, at 1B.
88
See FTC Workshop, supra note 13, at 1176; Jason Hoppin, Florida Judge Compares
Milberg to Squeegee Boy, RECORDER, Apr. 16, 2002, at 1.
89
Hantler & Norton, supra note 11, at 1344.
84
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value than the ostensible face value of the coupon. Class counsel, in
contrast, receive attorney’s fees in the form of large sums of cash, historically based on a significant percentage of the aggregate face value
91
of the coupons offered to the class. The overriding fear of these settlements is that the three central players in the class action drama
come out ahead: the court clears its docket; defendants receive global
peace at relatively little cost (including the potential to induce future
transactions that are profitable, even discounted by the coupon); and
class counsel is handsomely compensated. Absent class members—
those whose rights are waived, and who receive only a coupon in
92
compensation—are very often left out in the cold.
93
Coupon settlements are not inherently problematic. When
structured even-handedly, they benefit plaintiffs by providing redress
from injury, present defendants with an incentive to correct their allegedly wrongful or tortious behavior, as well as provide global peace
to the claims alleged against them by allowing avoidance of duplica94
tive litigation. Furthermore, they are often necessary—“a defendant
might be driven into bankruptcy if substantial cash damages are
awarded, while coupons can provide class members with at least some
95
benefit.” However, as coupon settlements became more prevalent,
they revealed a serious defect: class counsel and defendants began
collusively structuring settlements that benefited each other, to the
96
detriment of absent class members. Counsel and defendants were
able to use coupon settlements as a smoke screen to justify disposing
97
of the litigation to each other’s substantive advantage. By structuring damages in the form of a theoretically high-value aggregate coupon offering to the plaintiff class, attorneys were able to take home
90

Id. at 1344, 1346–49 (discussing low coupon realization percentages and the
comparatively low value of actual coupon relief in relation to the face value of the
coupon).
91
Id. at 1344; see also Rubenstein, supra note 13, at 11.
92
See Hantler & Norton, supra note 11, at 1343.
93
James Tharin & Brian Blockovich, Coupons and the Class Action Fairness Act, 18
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1443, 1445 (2006).
94
Hantler & Norton, supra note 11, at 1344.
95
Edward F. Sherman, Class Actions After the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 80
TUL. L. REV. 1593, 1614 (2006).
96
See FTC Workshop, supra note 13, at 1167. Unlike private litigation, class action litigation, particularly in the coupon settlement context, features settlements
that “run a significant risk of collusion between opposing counsel.” Id.
97
See id. at 1168 (discussing the various structures of coupon settlements that defendants tend to employ); see also Hantler & Norton, supra note 11, at 1344 (stating
that lawyers in the coupon settlement context normally “receive cash fees in amounts
that generally dwarf the award recovered by individual plaintiffs”); supra notes 48–68
and accompanying text.
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sizable fees, and defendants were able to get away with paying much
less than they would have if the settlement had called for a cash
98
award.
Today, few proposed coupon settlements successfully and sub99
stantially benefit absent class members. In the classic unfairly structured coupon settlement, class attorneys inflate the apparent value of
the coupon offering so as to receive a fee that dwarfs the award re100
In return, the defendants implecovered by individual plaintiffs.
ment usage restrictions, limiting the ability and desire of absent class
101
members to redeem their coupon compensation.
Implementation
of these usage restrictions takes a variety of forms: imposing administrative hurdles to the acquisition of the coupons; restricting the
products or services to which the coupons may be applied; limiting
the transferability of the coupons; enforcing a prohibitive expiration
date; enforcing “blackout” dates on which the coupons are non102
By reusable; and imposing limits on the aggregation of coupons.
stricting the practical ability or desire of class members to redeem the
coupons, the actual value of the coupon offering is normally worth
103
far less than advertised.
In this archetypical example, the class counsel obviously benefits
104
from exorbitant fees generated by an inflated settlement value.
As
a complement benefit, defendants realize value added from the settlement when they are able to buy off—cheaply—any future suits,
given the preclusive effect of the class action settlement, and are able
to pay very little in the way of actual damages (when coupons go un105
redeemed).
Defendants also benefit when class members are in98

See Sherman, supra note 95, at 1614.
Tharin & Blockovich, supra note 93, at 1449.
100
Hantler & Norton, supra note 11, at 1344.
101
Robert H. Klonoff & Mark Hermann, The Class Action Fairness Act: An IllConceived Approach to Class Settlements, 80 TUL. L. REV. 1695, 1699–1700 (2006).
102
Id.
103
Rubenstein, supra note 13, at 11.
104
Tharin & Blockovich, supra note 93, at 1446.
105
FTC Workshop, supra note 13, at 1167–68. At the FTC Workshop, Professor
Christopher Leslie detailed four possible outcomes that accrue to defendants when
individual class members act with respect to their coupon payment. First, an individual “class member might not use the settlement coupon at all.” Id. at 1167. Second, the class member “could use the coupon because the settlement coupon induced her to make a purchase that she otherwise would not have made.” Id. at
1167–68. Third, the “class member could use her coupon for a purchase that she
was planning to make anyway.” Id. at 1168. Finally, the “class member could transfer
the settlement coupon to a third party who uses it.” Id. Because defendants benefit
when the first two options occur—under the first outcome, the defendant pays nothing; under the second outcome, the defendant earns revenue that it otherwise would
99
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duced to purchase a product or service that they otherwise would not
have purchased (so they can avoid the feeling of getting nothing
106
Absent class members, however, are relefrom the settlement).
gated to the receipt of a coupon which very often provides little or no
107
value.
Compounding this problem is the reality that neither class
attorneys, who benefit (notwithstanding their fiduciary duty to the
class) from maximizing their fees, nor defendants, who obviously prefer to minimize the amount they must pay under the settlement, have
an incentive to put the interests of allegedly harmed plaintiffs before
108
their own.
109
This “horror story” is more than a theoretical nightmare. In
110
an oft-cited Seventh Circuit decision, the plaintiffs alleged that the
Bank of Boston had over-collected escrow monies from homeowners
111
The settlement, which had been
and profited from the interest.
approved by an Alabama judge, awarded up to $8.76 in account cred112
its to individual class members.
The plaintiffs’ lawyers received
more than $8.5 million in fees, which were debited directly from in113
dividual class members’ escrow accounts, resulting in a net loss to
114
many or all of the class members.
In its report supporting the passage of CAFA, the Senate Judiciary Committee catalogued specific examples of the Settlement Cou115
pon Problem in practice.
A few cases the Committee noted are
summarized below.
not have earned—they have additional incentive to structure coupon settlements to
reach these outcomes. Id. at 1167–68.
106
Id.
107
Id. at 1163 (describing how coupon settlements often provide consumers with
no meaningful relief).
108
Id. at 1169–70 (explaining that evidence suggests that procedural safeguards
designed to inhibit self-interested settlements between class counsel and defendants
are insufficient).
109
Shapiro, supra note 69, at 191–92.
110
Kamilewicz v. Bank of Boston, 92 F.3d 506 (7th Cir. 1996).
111
Victor E. Schwartz, Mark A. Behrens & Leah Lorber, Federal Courts Should Decide
Interstate Class Actions: A Call for Federal Class Action Diversity Jurisdiction Reform, 37
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 483, 494 (2000).
112
Id.
113
Id.
114
See id. (detailing one class member whose escrow account was debited $144.25
as a miscellaneous disbursement which paid for the attorney’s fees agreed upon in
the settlement); see also Beisner, Shors & Miller, supra note 27, at 1446 (relating the
story of another class member whose account was debited eighty dollars toward the
payment of the class counsel fee).
115
S. REP. NO. 108-123, at 16–18 (2003); see also Beisner, Shors & Miller, supra
note 27, at 1447 (summarizing the various cases that the Senate Judiciary Committee
flagged due to inequitable coupon settlement proposals).
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In Ramsey v. Nestle Waters North America, Inc., a prime example
117
of a so-called “squeegee boy” case, plaintiffs alleged that Poland
Springs water actually did not come from a deep spring in the woods
of Maine, as the company had advertised. The proposed settlement
provided discounts on Poland Springs water to class plaintiffs, while
the attorneys pocketed $1.35 million. In other words, the absent class
members received discounts on the very product they alleged caused
118
them harm.
119
In re Kansas Microsoft Litigation is an excellent example of restrictive coupon provisions that devalue a proposed settlement. Microsoft settled ten state antitrust class actions in which the software
giant allegedly used its monopolistic powers to unfairly increase
prices. The settlement called for the distribution of a five- to tendollar coupon, good for a discount on future purchases of particular
120
computer software or hardware.
To realize the value of the settlement, class members had to download a special redemption form on
Microsoft’s website, fill it out, and mail it in. Furthermore, to redeem
the coupon, the class member was required to re-mail the voucher,
along with a photocopy of an original receipt and an original UPC
121
Code. Finally, the vouchers were good only for particular Microsoft
122
products. In addition to the disproportionate relationship between
the excessive attorney’s fees and the sharply limited dollar value of
individual coupons, the complexity and trouble of actually using the
123
Moreover, class attorcoupon corrupts the settlement’s validity.”
neys sought hundreds of millions of dollars in fees (actual recovery
124
was undisclosed). For the class members, the difficulty in realizing
any actual value is likely to dissuade many of those who might otherwise use the coupon, and would in any event lessen the real value of
125
the coupon to the small subset of class members who did use it.
126
In DeGradi v. KB Holdings, Inc., the plaintiffs asserted that KB
Toys engaged in deceptive pricing practices on certain products.
116

No. 03 CHK 817 (Ill. Cir. Ct.. Nov. 5, 2003).
See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
118
Edward D. Murphy et al., Conflict and Change, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD, Jan. 4,
2004, at 1F.
119
No. 99 CV 17089 (Kan. Dist. Ct. July 29, 2003).
120
Beisner, Shors & Miller, supra note 27, at 1448.
121
Id.
122
Id.
123
See In re Kansas Microsoft Litigation¸ No. 99 CV 17089.
124
Id.
125
See id.
126
No. 02 CH 15838 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Oct. 1, 2003).
117
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Under the settlement agreement, the toy retailer agreed to reduce
certain products by thirty percent over a six-day period. Put more
127
The attorneys received about
simply, the defendant “held a sale.”
128
one million dollars.
129
In Chavez v. GameStop Corp., a class of plaintiffs alleged that the
defendant video game distributor was not selling new video games as
advertised but was selling previously purchased games that had been
returned. Under the settlement, any plaintiff who could produce a
receipt would receive a coupon for five percent off the price of any
one game. Thus, plaintiffs could purchase a new game for $1.25 less
than the $25 purchase price, but only if they kept their receipts.
They could not redeem the coupon over Gamestop’s website, but had
130
131
to redeem it at a retail store. Class counsel received $125,000.
132
In Ross v. Portillo’s Restaurant Group Inc., aggrieved consumers
filed a complaint that a Chicago restaurant chain had fraudulently
misrepresented their beer steins’ volume to be twelve ounces, when
in fact the containers held only 10.6 ounces. The settlement called
for plaintiffs to receive coupons good for one dollar off every subse133
quent five-dollar purchase at any restaurant in the chain.
134
In Shields v. Bridgestone/Firestone Inc., the class plaintiffs were
owners of Firestone tires that had been recalled by the National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration for various defects, yet had
caused no injury or property damage. Under a settlement ratified by
a Texas court, Firestone agreed to redesign certain tires, which it had
already planned to do irrespective of the lawsuit, and to develop a

127

Beisner, Shors & Miller, supra note 27, at 1449.
Stephanie Zimmermann, KB Toys Settles Lawsuit over “Low” Prices by Offering Discount, CHICAGO SUN-TIMES, Oct. 11, 2003, at 3.
129
No. CGC-02-406658 (Cal. Super. Ct. Sept. 22, 2003).
130
As with the problem with the proposed coupon settlement in In re Kansas Microsoft Litigation, No. 99 CV 17089 (Kan. Dist. Ct. July 29, 2003), the proposed settlement in this case offers not only very little in terms of dollars and cents, but also
makes it logistically difficult to actually derive any value from the coupons even if one
wanted to do so. See supra notes 119–25 and accompanying text.
131
Gamestop.com, Notice of Class Action and Proposed Settlement (Aug. 1,
2003), available at http://www.gamestop.com/gs/help/classaction.asp.
132
No. 00 CH 13612 (Ill. Cir. Nov. 18, 2003).
133
Judge Approves Portillo's Class Action Settlement over Mislabeled Beer, PR NEWSWIRE,
Nov. 26, 2003. The problem with this settlement is emblematic of the general Coupon Settlement Problem—while class members do receive a discount on future purchases of ale, the settlement forces injured customers to expend an additional four
dollars to receive one dollar in recovery, increasing the defendants’ revenue stream
more than it might have had the settlement never been accepted. See id.
134
No. E-0167637 (Tex. Dist. Ct. July 31, 2002).
128

DAY_FINAL

1104

6/12/2008 11:49:56 AM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38:1085

consumer education and awareness campaign. Class members re135
ceived nothing. The lawyers received nineteen million dollars.
Several other amusing yet disconcerting cases have contributed
to the public perception that the American class action system pro136
motes sham resolutions.
For instance, General Mills settled a class
action lawsuit over improper pesticides that had come into contact
137
with the oats used to make Cheerios.
Plaintiffs’ counsel acknowledged that no physical harm had actually been caused to any class
138
member. Class members pocketed a coupon good for a free box of
Cheerios. The settlement garnered the attorneys almost two million
139
dollars.
In an action against a company that was alleged to be producing
unsafe baby cribs, class members received either a crib repair kit or a
coupon for fifty-five dollars, which could be used toward the future
140
Of course, the coupurchase of any of the defendant’s products.
pon offering was valuable only for consumers who planned to have
another baby and still trusted the very company that produced the
141
faulty cribs.
Finally, in what could be the most jaw-dropping coupon settlement to date, Acushnet, a Chicago company, during a promotion in
which it was giving away golf gloves, exhausted its free inventory and
began handing out free sleeves of golf balls instead. On behalf of all
“injured” recipients of free golf balls, attorneys filed suit against
Acushnet for its “transgressions,” and the defendant and class counsel
began settlement negotiations. The resulting settlement, certified by

135

See Miles Moore, BFS Settles Nationwide Class Action Suit, RUBBER & PLASTICS
NEWS, Aug. 4, 2003.
136
See, e.g., Andrew S. Weinstein, Note, Avoiding the Race to Res Judicata: Federal Antisuit Injunctions of Competing State Class Actions, 75 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1085, 1085 (2000).
137
See Ameet Sachdev, Coupon Awards Reward Whom? Class-Action Settlements that Pay
Lawyers Millions of Dollars and Give Plaintiffs Coupons that are Sometimes Useless are Drawing Ire in Congress and Some Courts, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 29, 2004, at C1; David Zizzo, Lawsuit Can Mean Big Bucks for Tiny Tort, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Sept. 17, 1995, at 1.
138
Sachdev, supra note 137, at 1.
139
Id.
140
Dorel Juvenile Group Settles Class Action Lawsuits, PR NEWSWIRE, Oct. 6, 2003, LexisNexis Library, PR Newswire File.
141
Id.; see also U.S. Chamber Inst. For Legal Reform, State Court Class Action Settlements: A Pattern of Abuse and a Proposed Solution, at 4, available at http://www.ftc.gov
/bcp/workshops/classaction/other/inst_legalreform.pdf (last visited Feb. 18, 2007)
[hereinafter A Pattern of Abuse].
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an Illinois judge, granted aggrieved class members another free
142
143
sleeve of golf balls. Class counsel took home $100,000 in fees.
In response to the award of wholly inequitable relief to absent
class members with legitimate (or at least colorable) claims, Congress
passed CAFA to restore the notion of fundamental fairness to the
American class action system. Moreover, the goal was to rid class ac144
tions of attorney-created cash cows that provided little to no benefit
for plaintiffs that were not actually injured, did not care about de
minimis relief, or simply did not know that a class action lawsuit had
been filed on their behalf.
III. THE CLASS ACTION FAIRNESS ACT OF 2005
The genesis of the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 dates as far
back as the late 1990s. The Act was created in response to exponen145
tial growth in the number of class actions, as well as a wave of criti146
cism of the American class action system permeating the country.
The bill originally contained only expansions of federal court juris147
diction, but Congress later amended it by adding a wider array of
148
President
reforms that included the Act’s settlement provisions.
149
Bush signed the bill into law on February 18, 2005, amid a spectacle
of legislators, media, advocacy groups, contributors to the bill, and
invited guests that had been affected by manipulation of the class ac-

142

Hantler & Norton, supra note 11, at 1358; see also Martha Johanek, Caddies or
Cads? Class-Action Lawyers Find the Green in Errant Golf Balls, SUN-SENTINEL (Fort
Lauderdale, Fla.), Sept. 13, 1999, at 21A.
143
Hantler & Norton, supra note 11, at 1358.
144
Beisner, Shors & Miller, supra note 27, at 1450.
145
John H. Beisner & Jessica Davidson Miller, They’re Making a Federal Case of It . . .
in State Court, 25 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 143, 157 (2001) (summarizing studies that
show that the number of class actions tripled during the 1990s).
146
See, e.g., Editorial, Actions Without Class, WASH. POST, Aug. 27, 2001, at A14 (observing that “no portion of the American civil justice system [was in] more of a mess
than the world of class actions”); Editorial, Class-Action Plaintiffs Deserve More Than
Coupons, USA TODAY, Oct. 9, 2002, at 12A; Editorial, Class Action Showdown, WALL ST.
J., July 8, 2004, at A14; Editorial, Reforming Class Actions, WASH. POST, June 15, 2003, at
B6.
147
H.R. 3789, 105th Cong. (1998).
148
See, e.g., S. 2062, 108th Cong. (2004); S. 274, 108th Cong. (2003); H.R. 1115,
108th Cong. (2003); S. 1712, 107th Cong. (2001); S. 353, 106th Cong. (1999); H.R.
1875, 106th Cong. (1999); S. 2083, 105th Cong. (1998). The bill that was finally
signed into law was S. 5, 109th Cong. (2005). The main sponsor of the bill was Senator Charles Grassley. See id.
149
Press Release, Office of the White House Press Sec’y, President Signs ClassAction Fairness Act of 2005 (Feb. 18, 2005), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/
news/releases/2005/02/20050218-11.html.
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150

tion system.
Citing the need for class action reform, President
Bush stated that the law
helps ensure justice by making two essential reforms. First, it
moves most large, interstate class-actions into federal courts. . . .
Second, the bill provides new safeguards to ensure that plaintiffs
and class-action lawsuits are treated fairly. The bill requires
judges to consider the real monetary value of coupons and discounts, so that victims can count on true compensation for their
151
injuries.

The two relevant segments of the Class Action Fairness Act that
are pertinent to this Comment are summarized below: the expansion
of federal court jurisdiction over multi-state class actions, and, of particular relevance here, the provision attempting to curb coupon settlement abuses.
A. Expansion of Federal Court Jurisdiction
152

To resolve perceived abusive class action forum shopping,
153
Congress enacted CAFA in part to greatly expand the jurisdictional
powers of the federal courts over class actions involving parties who

150

Id.
Id. President Bush went on to say that the legislation shows “progress” in the
class action arena, and that “there’s more [work] to do.” Id. Given the arguments
advanced in Part IV, infra, along with President Bush’s qualifying statements about
the effectiveness of the legislation he signed, one can plausibly argue that even at the
time of enactment, the actual substantive effectiveness of CAFA was in doubt.
152
Whatever the merit behind the argument that class action lawyers abused the
class action system by filing interstate class action complaints in so-called “magic jurisdictions,” see Hantler & Norton, supra note 11, at 1346, that debate far exceeds the
scope of this Comment and will be left for another day. CAFA’s jurisdictional expansions are relevant here only insofar as the Act’s potential to dramatically increase the
number of coupon settlements proposed in federal court. See supra note 26 and accompanying text. For commentary on class action forum shopping, see Medical
Monitoring and Asbestos Litigation—A Discussion with Richard Scruggs and Victor Schwartz,
MEALEY’S LITIG. REP. ASBESTOS, Mar. 1, 2002, at 19.
153
The Senate Report of CAFA’s passage sheds further light on the motivation of
the sponsors of the bill: “[B]ecause interstate class actions typically involve more
people, more money, and more interstate commerce ramifications than any other
type of lawsuit, the Committee firmly believes that such cases properly belong in federal court.” S. REP. No. 109-14 (2005). Along these same lines, a major goal of the
bill was to keep American federalism intact. Specifically, a recurring problem with
multistate class actions was the preclusive effect a judgment in one state had on class
members who filed their own action in a different state. Id. In other words, states
bound parties from other states to a decision based upon their own view of the law.
Congress believed the federal courts were best equipped to balance concerns of efficient multi-jurisdiction litigation and individual due process. Class Action Fairness
Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 2(b)(2), 119 Stat. 4, 5 (2005).
151
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154

are citizens of different states. Under the Act, federal district courts
have original jurisdiction over any civil action in which the aggregate
155
amount in controversy is greater than $5 million, and is a class ac156
tion in which any plaintiff class member is a citizen of a state or for157
This amended the coneign nation different from any defendant.
158
ventional rule by allowing for minimal diversity, whereas before
CAFA all named class representatives must have had distinct citizen159
ship from all defendants.
Furthermore, CAFA relaxes the amount
160
161
in controversy requirement; the traditional rule required each
162
class member to meet the specified amount in controversy.
While
the changes are expansive, the Act limits federal jurisdiction to class
actions where the aggregate number of plaintiff class members
163
amounts to at least one hundred. CAFA also provides for a number
164
of exceptions to the Act’s jurisdictional expansion.
Another major jurisdictional provision in CAFA is the enhancement of defendants’ removal powers when a class action is filed in
165
state court.
Conventional removal procedures permit only out-of166
state defendants to remove a case to federal court.
Furthermore,
prior to the passage of CAFA, where the class action was filed against

154

Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 §§ 4–5, 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1332(d), 1453 (West
2007). The Act makes no changes to federal question class actions. Rubenstein, supra note 13, at 4.
155
28 U.S.C.A. § 1332(d)(2).
156
The Act defines a class action as “any civil action filed under rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or similar State statute or rule of judicial procedure authorizing an action to be brought by 1 or more representative persons as a class action.” Id. § 1332(d)(1(B).
157
Id. § 1332(d)(2)(A).
158
Id.
159
Rubenstein, supra note 13, at 5.
160
28 U.S.C.A. § 1332(d)(6).
161
See Zahn v. Int’l Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291, 294–95 (1973) superseded by statute, 28
U.S.C. § 1367 (2006). Section 1367 permits absent class members’ claims to be
joined via supplemental jurisdiction so long as at least one named plaintiff meets the
amount in controversy. See Rubenstein, supra note 13, at 4.
162
Currently, the amount in controversy required for diversity jurisdiction is set at
$75,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2006).
163
28 U.S.C.A. § 1332(d)(5)(B).
164
Id. § 1332 (d)(4)–(5). These exceptions include: (1) compulsory and permissive local controversy exceptions for truly intra-state disputes, (2) a “Delaware carveout” designed to keep corporate cases in Delaware chancery courts, and (3) a civil
rights exception, allowing states to keep sovereign immunity defenses available for
state actors. Id.
165
28 U.S.C. § 1453.
166
28 U.S.C. § 1441(b).
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multiple defendants, universal consent to removal was required.
Also, defendants were statutorily barred from removing to federal
168
Finally,
court after one year of the commencement of the action.
decisions by the district court to remand to state court were not re169
viewable.
Under CAFA, these restrictions are relaxed: any defendant, in170
cluding in-state defendants, may remove to federal court, provided
the action fits CAFA’s jurisdictional requirement; concurrence of
other defendants is unnecessary for a defendant to unilaterally re171
move the case to federal court; the one year removal time limit is
172
erased; and finally, district court decisions to remand to state court
173
are reviewable within seven days.
Congress took a bold step by enacting sweeping reforms to federal court jurisdiction with regard to class actions. Commentators
generally agree that these changes give defendants a new procedural
174
Howweapon to defend collective actions asserted against them.
ever broad the general scope of CAFA’s jurisdiction provisions are, it
appears self-evident that the expansion of federal court jurisdiction
over multistate class action litigation engenders manifestation of the
Coupon Settlement Problem, more than ever before, in federal
court. As discussed in Part III, the already burdened dockets of federal district judges will be weighed down, increasing the likelihood of
inadequate supervision of coupon settlements, and thereby diminishing the probability that absent class members will be sufficiently compensated for their alleged injuries.

167

See, e.g., Brierly v. Alusuisse Flexible Packaging, Inc., 184 F.3d 527, 533–34 n.3
(6th Cir. 1999) (“[I]n order for a notice of removal to be properly before the court,
all defendants who have been served or otherwise properly joined in the action must
either join in the removal, or file a written consent to the removal.”).
168
28 U.S.C § 1446(b).
169
Id. § 1447(d).
170
28 U.S.C.A. § 1453(b)(2007).
171
Id.
172
Id.
173
Id. § 1453(c)(1).
174
See, e.g., Beisner, Shors & Miller, supra note 27, at 1444; C. Douglas Floyd, The
Inadequacy of the Interstate Commerce Justification for the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005,
55 EMORY L.J. 487, 491–93 (2006) (CAFA significantly expands the scope of original
and removal jurisdiction); Rubenstein, supra note 13, at 15 (“Those defending state
court class actions definitely have a new weapon in their arsenal in the ability to remove [class actions] to federal court.”); Sherman, supra note 95, at 1615 (“CAFA is
the most significant change in class action practice since the 1966 amendment of
Rule 23 . . . .”); Id. at 1608 (“After CAFA, the federal courts are essentially ‘the only
game in town’ for multistate and national class actions.”).
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B. CAFA’s Coupon Settlement Provisions
For all of the excessive abuses surrounding class actions and
175
coupon settlements, the Class Action Consumers Bill of Rights (the
major provision of the Class Action Fairness Act designed to inhibit
these and other exploitations) is surprisingly straightforward and
176
177
The “heart” of the Bill of Rights adsharply limited in scope.
178
dresses attorney’s fees in the coupon settlement context. Other settlement process-related provisions of CAFA’s Bill of Rights prohibit
settlements that result in a net financial loss to individual class members, absent a “written finding that non-monetary benefits to the class
179
member substantially outweigh the monetary loss”; ban all settlements that disproportionately reward in-state class members com180
pared to out-of-state class members; and require notification to
“appropriate” government officials of any proposed class action set181
tlement.
The attorney’s fees provisions, however, are the backbone of the
Bill of Rights. CAFA mandates that if a proposed settlement calls for
a “recovery of coupons to a class member, the portion of any attorney’s fee award to class counsel that is attributable to the award of the
coupons shall be based on the value to class members of the coupons
182
that are redeemed.” In other words, prior to CAFA, if the coupon settlement called for the defendant to distribute $500 million worth of
coupons to class members, class counsel could pocket a percentage of
this amount (for example, 20%, or $100 million). However, given
that the settlement was likely to be structured to limit individual class
183
member’s ability or desire to redeem the coupon, the actual value
of the settlement would likely be far less than $500 million (perhaps
even less than what class counsel charged for its fee, a particularly
odd and inequitable result).

175

See supra Part II.B.
Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 § 3(a), 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1711–1715 (West
2007).
177
Rubenstein, supra note 13, at 10.
178
28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1711–1715.
179
Id. § 1713. This section responded to Kamilewicz v. Bank of Boston, 92 F.3d 506
(7th Cir. 1996). See supra note 110 and accompanying text; see also Rubenstein, supra
note 13, at 12.
180
Id. § 1714; see also Rubenstein, supra note 13, at 12.
181
Id. § 1715; see also Rubenstein, supra note 13, at 13. These provisions all seem
reasonable, laudable, and efficacious. As such, this Comment does not argue that
these provisions are ineffective in any way.
182
Id. § 1712(a) (emphasis added).
183
See supra Part II.B.
176
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After CAFA, counsel may only receive a fee award in a coupon
case based on the value of coupons that class members actually re184
deem. In the above hypothetical, for example, if only $100 million
worth of coupons are redeemed, counsel will earn only $20 million
(20% of $100 million), instead of $100 million (20% of $500 mil185
Furthermore, as a necessary consequence of this provision,
lion).
counsel must wait until it is reasonably evident that all who will re186
deem the coupons have done so already. This waiting period guarantees that counsel does not run off with the fee before the class
187
members have had a chance to claim their award.
If attorney’s fees are not calculated based on the coupon redemption percentage, CAFA requires that they be calculated based
on the amount of time class counsel reasonably expended working
188
189
If
on the action, and such fees must be approved by the court.
there is a mix of coupons and equitable relief, including injunctive
remedies, “that portion of the attorney’s fee to be paid to class counsel that is based upon a portion of the recovery of the coupons shall
190
be calculated in accordance with subsection (a),” and “that portion
of the attorney’s fee to be paid to class counsel that is not based upon
a portion of the recovery of the coupons shall be calculated in accor191
In other words, counsel and defendance with subsection (b).”
dants may structure a settlement in which there is a mix of legal and
equitable relief, but the attorney’s fees must accurately reflect the ac192
CAFA also allows, but
tual award absent class members receive.
does not require, a district court to “receive expert testimony from a

184

This method of fee calculation will be occasionally referred to in this Comment as the “percentage method.”
185
See Rubenstein, supra note 13, at 11.
186
Shapiro, supra note 69, at 184.
187
Id.
188
Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 §3(a), 28 U.S.C.A. § 1712(b)(1) (West 2007).
189
28 U.S.C.A. § 1712(b)(2). This subsection goes on to state that nothing shall
be construed to prohibit application of a lodestar with a multiplier method of determining attorney’s fees. Id. The lodestar with a multiplier is a method of calculating attorney’s fees by “multiplying a reasonable number of hours worked by the prevailing hourly rate in the community for similar work, and often considering such
additional factors as the degree of skill and difficulty involved in the case, the degree
of its urgency, its novelty, and the like.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 960 (8th ed. 1999).
The multiplier has the potential to significantly increase the attorney’s fee over a
straight lodestar. Stanley M. Grossman, Statutory Fee Shifting in Civil Rights Class Actions: Incentive or Liability?, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 587, 591 (1997).
190
28 U.S.C.A. § 1712(c)(1).
191
Id. § 1712(c)(2).
192
Rubenstein, supra note 13, at 11.
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witness qualified to provide information on the actual value to the
193
class members of the coupons that are redeemed.”
The rationale for the foregoing provisions is simple—by limiting
the attorney’s fees to an amount that actually reflects the true value of
the aggregate award, attorneys will be induced to ensure that the substantive value accruing to class members is high, thereby justifying a
194
high return for the attorney.
The framers of the Act believed this
to be preferable to a fee structure based on a theoretical coupon offering that is not indicative of how much benefit actually accrues to
195
Put another way, the Act attempts to force plainclass members.
196
tiffs’ attorneys to “share in the success,” or lack thereof, of the offered coupon settlement. Ideally, the attorney’s fees provisions will
induce class attorneys to “focus sharply and intently up-front on mak197
Whether
ing the coupons redeemable, and therefore valuable.”
198
this is actually a realistic notion is yet to be seen.
Finally, CAFA permits the effectuation of a settlement only when
the district judge has certified, via written finding after a fairness
hearing, that where the proposed settlement calls for class members
to receive coupons, the settlement is “fair, reasonable, and adequate
199
for class members.”
This subsection further grants the district
court the discretion to require that the settlement provide for the distribution of a portion of the value of unclaimed coupons to charity or
200
to the government, and that any such distributions are not to be
201
used in the calculation of counsel fees.
In its report upon passage of the Act, the Senate Judiciary Committee stated that when courts determine whether a proposed coupon settlement is “fair, reasonable and adequate,” district judges
should look to “the real monetary value and the likely utilization rate
202
of the coupons provided by the settlement.”
The text of the subsection, however, gives no guidance on what “fair, reasonable, and
193

28 U.S.C.A. § 1712(d).
S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 30 (2005) (Conf. Rep.).
195
See id.
196
Tharin & Blockovich, supra note 93, at 1451.
197
Id. at 1449.
198
Indeed, while CAFA’s counsel fees provisions may seem to take care of the
Coupon Settlement Problem, this likely is not the case. As Part IV.A, infra, argues,
attorney’s fees restrictions alone, whether successful or not at achieving the diminution of exorbitant fees, are not sufficient to guarantee substantive relief to absent
class members.
199
Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 § 3(a), 28 U.S.C.A. § 1712(e) (West 2007).
200
Id.
201
Id.
202
S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 31 (2005).
194
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adequate” actually means. Commentators have acknowledged that
this standard adds nothing substantively to judges’ settlement review
203
hearings; Rule 23(e) already governs under the same standard.
Historically lax judicial scrutiny over proposed coupon settle204
205
ments and CAFA’s replication of the Rule 23(e) judicial scrutiny
206
standard yields an ominous result: CAFA’s admirable goals crumble
upon an insufficient judicial oversight mechanism because it will not
sufficiently alter the status quo. A thorough analysis of the statutory
provisions and practical ramifications of the Act confirms that this is
likely the case.
IV. CAFA’S SUBSTANTIVE SHORTCOMINGS
A. CAFA’s Attorney’s Fees Provisions Will Not Function
as Well as Intended
While many commentators expect CAFA’s limitations on massive
attorney’s fees pursuant to a coupon settlement to have a profound
207
effect on class action abuse, potential loopholes in the fees provision will allow clever class attorneys and defendants to win the day
over CAFA. Careful scrutiny of the Act makes a number of plausible
detours around the legislation’s purported protections easily identifi208
able. These obscure escape hatches are reviewed below.
First, CAFA does not explicitly mandate that attorney’s fees be
209
based upon a percentage of the aggregate coupon redemption. Attorneys may be able to craft coupon settlements similar to those that
occurred pre-CAFA, while taking home a sizable fee (though perhaps
not as sizable as a percentage of the coupon offering), thus inflicting
the same substantive harm on class members. Specifically, while
§ 1712(a) may seem to mandate that fees must be calculated as a percentage of actually redeemed coupons, the subsection merely commands that fees that are attributable to the award of coupons be calcu203

See, e.g., MOORE ET AL., supra note 34, ¶ 23.164; Klonoff & Herrman, supra note
101, at 1704.
204
See supra Part II.B.
205
28 U.S.C.A. § 1712(e).
206
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e).
207
See, e.g., Shapiro, supra note 69, at 185; Tharin & Blockovich, supra note 93, at
1450.
208
The dilemmas raised in this section are largely dependent on the infirmity of
the § 1712(e) backstop. In other words, practical problems with CAFA’s fees provision are dependent on the inadequate judicial scrutiny provision, which is discussed
in Part IV.B, infra.
209
28 U.S.C.A. § 1712(a); see also Rubenstein, supra note 13, at 11, 15.
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lated based upon the actual redemption amount.
Nothing in
§ 1712(a) specifically prevents attorneys from utilizing a lodestar with
211
In other words, the plain
a multiplier system of fee calculation.
meaning of the Act would seem to allow attorneys to choose between
212
the percentage and lodestar methods.
Alternatively, even if
§ 1712(a) is interpreted to mandate the percentage method, class attorneys will merely structure the settlement to include some sort of
injunctive relief, thereby moving the proposed settlement under the
213
purview of § 1712(b). Thus, simply by adding a request for injunctive relief to the complaint, even if such a remedy would not provide
an adequate solution, class counsel may well be able to circumvent
the percentage method.
The practical implication of class counsel’s ability to choose the
fee calculation method is fairly evident—while class counsel’s fees
may be restricted somewhat under the percentage method, nothing
holds them to this fee arrangement. Thus, attorneys may be willing
to settle on a lower (though sizable) fee, based on the lodestar with a
multiplier method, in order to structure a quick settlement with a defendant that calls for unjust coupon relief to absent class members.
Supporting this position, Professor Coffee asserts that the “lodestar
formula enables collusion to occur on an implicit, rather than ex214
plicit, basis.” Once the time expended on a case justifies a fee that
approaches a number likely to be earned under the percentage
method, the class counsel has an incentive to accept a settlement offer from the defendant, irrespective of the substantive remedy of215
Because attorney’s fees are timefered to absent class members.
sensitive calculations under the lodestar approach, Coffee argues that
collusion is built into the settlement negotiations: “under the lodestar

210

Id.
See Rubenstein, supra note 13, at 11. In his analysis, Professor Rubenstein argues that § 1712 may seem to compel the percentage method whenever coupons are
used. Id. However, given the language of § 1712(a) (“attributable to the [coupon]
award,” as opposed to in all circumstances), as well as the rest of § 1712, Professor
Rubenstein argues that the percentage method is only compelled if the award is to
be calculated based on the coupon offering. Id.
212
28 U.S.C.A. § 1712(a).
213
Indeed, § 1712(b)(2) specifically provides that “nothing in this subsection shall
be construed to prohibit the application of a lodestar with a multiplier method of
determining attorney’s fees.” Id. § 1712(b); see also S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 30–31
(2005).
214
John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff’s Attorney: The Implications of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86
COLUM. L. REV. 669, 717 (1986).
215
See supra notes 48–68 and accompanying text.
211
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formula, actual collusion is replaced by structural collusion.” Thus,
under the lodestar method, the concerns underlying the potential for
217
collusive settlement offerings remain intact.
On the other hand, use of the post-CAFA percentage method
may decrease the incentives for class counsel to put significant time
into a case to arrive at a coupon settlement that provides adequate
recovery to absent class members. Class counsel might now be inspired to throw together lawsuits and settlements that result in coupons that are in fact beneficial to class members (such that they will
be redeemed), but are worth far less than the actual value of the
claim. Thus, class counsel can put little time into a case and structure
a settlement that provides a real benefit to class members, though far
less than the potential value of the case. Consequently, counsel will
receive a fairly significant fee (dwarfing the limited time invested),
and the settlement will bargain away absent class members’ rights to
bring an individual or class claim in the future that would actually
fully compensate them for the harm they suffered.
Under either calculation method, CAFA’s fees-limiting provisions do nothing to guarantee sufficient substantive relief to class
members, but instead could be the catalyst for unscrupulous attorneys to compose the same inadequate coupon settlements, garnering
them a handsome fee (acutely disproportionate to individual class
members’ recovery) and providing defendants with a low-cost global
solution to their litigation. In essence, CAFA was structured with an
ill-advised tunnel vision toward attorney’s fees. The Act’s reforms focus strictly on the means (attorney’s fees) and not the ends (fair relief
to class members) of CAFA’s objectives. Because the means do not
adequately enforce a substantively just end, the provisions are ineffective.
Another problem that could arise is CAFA’s failure to define the
218
meaning of “coupon.”
This could pose a problem when class attorneys argue that the proposed settlement does not even fall under
the realm of § 1712. While the Act clearly applies to non-cash awards
that call for specified discounts on the defendant’s products or ser219
vices, in-kind settlements could be structured in a variety of ways in
an attempt to dodge CAFA’s limitations. For instance, “[w]ould frequent flyer miles in a settlement with an airline[] be a coupon set-

216
217
218
219

Coffee, supra note 215, at 718.
See supra notes 48–68 and accompanying text.
Klonoff & Herrman, supra note 101, at 1700 & n.22.
Id. at 1700.
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220

tlement?”
What about a “fluid recovery” settlement, where a taxi
221
company agrees to reduce fares in the long term? Given the openended statutory phrasing, it is unclear how much wiggle room class
attorneys have to collusively construct settlements with defendants in
order to circumvent the statute. If courts begin to construe “coupon”
narrowly, then there is a high probability that CAFA will not apply to
creative settlements where non-cash, non-coupon awards are offered
to class members. Thus, the fees limitations may well prove to be
avoidable, opening the door for the same substantive abuses, potentially solidifying absent class members’ historical position as easy targets for abuse.
Lastly, another reason CAFA’s fees provisions are insufficient is
222
that the Act does not unconditionally bar usage restrictions on cou223
Calculating attorneys and defendants may be able to strucpons.
ture theoretically high-value settlements that are fair enough to pass
224
judicial scrutiny and are appealing enough for class members to
redeem them, thus inflating attorney’s fees under CAFA, yet are restrictive enough to prevent class members from actually using or
wanting to use the coupon, thus driving the defendant’s actual costs
225
By placing limitations on the use of the coupons, attorneys
down.
admittedly do increase the risk of the settlement being rejected.
However, given the possible return of a facially valuable yet practically
unworthy solution, the possibility exists that use restrictions may become a larger part of the coupon settlement debate.
Given these practical concerns surrounding CAFA’s attorney’s
fees provisions, the Act should have incorporated a strong and principled judicial standard for review, rather than merely reiterating the
same standard that was ineffective in constraining pre-CAFA coupon
settlement abuses. However, Congress failed to equip federal district
220

See id.
Stan Karasi, The Role of Fluid Recovery in Consumer Product Litigation: Kraus v.
Trinity Management Service, 90 CAL. L. REV. 959, 970–72 (2002); see also Daar v. Yellow Cab Co., 433 P.2d 732, 746 (Cal. 1967) (discussing a preference for settlements
allowing injured parties to recover actual overpayments to taxicabs).
222
See supra notes 101–03 and accompanying text.
223
See generally Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 § 3(a), 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1711–1715
(West 2007). As this Part discusses, § 1712 addresses only the problem of excessive
attorney’s fees in proposed settlements, as well as the judicial scrutiny of the proposed settlement overall, but does not specifically address (and therefore does not
directly or indirectly prohibit outright) use restrictions on coupons offered in a settlement. See id.
224
As will be discussed in Part IV.B., infra, this is a far cry from an impossible
proposition.
225
See supra notes 105–08 and accompanying text.
221
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judges with the necessary arsenal to prevent substantively harmful
coupon settlements. This detail could prove to have an enormous
impact on the class action landscape. While the Act purports to substantively benefit class members by tying attorney’s fees to the actual
benefit from the settlement derived by class members, the potentially
inadequate provisions allow the destruction of a fundamental guarantee of substantive relief for absent class members. CAFA places too
much emphasis on the easily avoided market mechanism designed to
rein in exploitation. Completely absent from the statute is a backup
restriction stated in more flexible terms—a specific directive to
judges to apply more exacting scrutiny to coupon settlement proposals.
Furthermore, because of the history of abuse with class actions
226
in general and coupon settlements in particular, even if the attorney’s fees provisions are successful in limiting exorbitant legal compensation, the provisions do nothing to protect class members, absent the intuitive presumption that class attorneys will drive up the
value (and therefore the redemption rate and attorney’s fee) of the
coupon offering. However, this is unsupported conjecture. There is
no reason to believe that class counsel will now refrain from colluding with defendants to maximize their personal gain while leaving the
absent class members hanging by the wayside. CAFA’s attorney’s fees
restrictions erect a modest impediment to that incentive structure,
but one that is relatively easy to avoid, absent a meaningful back-end
restriction on substitute arrangements with the same practical effect.
Therefore, a stronger judicial scrutiny standard should be substituted
to provide for the fundamental guarantee of substantive relief to class
227
members.
B. CAFA’s Judicial Scrutiny Provision Ineffectively Guarantees
Substantive Relief
228

As discussed briefly above, CAFA mandates proposed coupon
settlements be approved upon a written finding that the settlement is
229
“fair, reasonable, and adequate to class members.”
This is substan230
Given that the juditively identical to the standard in Rule 23(e).
cial review of proposed coupon settlements was patently insufficient

226
227
228
229
230

See supra Part II.B.
See infra Part IV.B.
See supra notes 22–25, 200–05 and accompanying text.
Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 § 3(a), 28 U.S.C. § 1712(e) (West 2007).
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2).
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231

to prevent abuse before CAFA, there is no reason whatsoever to believe that merely reiterating the identical judicial review standard will
magically make the provision effective in the post-CAFA world. Congress’s mere reincantation of the Rule 23(e) standard that left abuse
unchecked creates a gaping hole in the legislation.
Although substantial commentary argues that the fairness inquiry adequately protected absent class members before CAFA and is
232
therefore suitable for judicial review after the passage of the Act,
considerable scholarly and empirical evidence suggests that judicial
scrutiny of coupon settlements in both state and federal courts was
233
entirely inadequate, given the upsurge of fundamentally unjust set234
tlements being approved prior to CAFA’s ratification.
While most
every scholar would agree that judicial approval of coupon settlements in state courts was the aggravating condition that precipitated
235
CAFA’s Class Action Consumer Bill of Rights, a significant debate
exists whether federal adjudicators are aptly prepared to protect absent class members in the post-CAFA world. For instance, the U.S.
Chamber for Legal Reform argues that because federal judges are
236
appointed for life and do not need to “refill . . . campaign cof237
fers” for re-election bids, federal judges have a greater predisposi238
tion for rejecting unfair coupon settlements.
The result, the
Chamber argues, is that because federal courts are more likely to
critically scrutinize proposed coupon settlements, absent class members are more likely to receive relief proportional to the size of their
239
injury (and their attorney’s fee).
231

See supra Part II.B.
See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 14 (2005) (arguing that “state court judges are
less careful than their federal court counterparts about applying procedural requirements that govern class actions”); A Pattern of Abuse, supra note 142, at 5–6.
233
See Buckner, supra note 25, at 200–01; Leslie, supra note 76, at 1070.
234
See supra Part II.B.
235
See, e.g., Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 2(a)(4), 119
Stat. 4, 5 (2005) (revealing congressional findings that state courts were harming the
national class action system).
236
See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
237
A Pattern of Abuse, supra note 141, at 6.
238
Id. at 5.
239
Id. at 6. The Chamber of Legal Reform supports this contention by citing numerous cases in which state courts approved an unfair coupon settlement, as well as
several cases in which federal courts rejected substantively inadequate coupon settlement proposals. See id. at 6–7 (citing Levell v. Monsanto Research Corp., 191
F.R.D. 543 (S.D. Ohio 2002); Schwartz v. Dallas Cowboys Football Club, Ltd., 157 F.
Supp. 2d 561 (E.D. Pa. 2001); Sheppard v. Consol. Edison Co., No. 94-CV-403 (JG),
2000 LEXIS 33313540 (E.D.N.Y. 2000); Polar Int’l Brokerage Corp. v. Reeve, 187
F.R.D. 108 (S.D.N.Y. 1999)).
232
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The Senate Judiciary Committee echoes this sentiment, asserting
that federal judges have access to the resources necessary to provide
adequate protection, and thus are more apt to consistently and thor240
oughly examine proposed settlements.
This may be true, but it is
not a complete answer. Just as the attorney’s fees provision provides
some protection, the greater capacity of the federal courts to police
unfair settlements is likely of some help to absent class members—but
it is not enough. The Act’s echoing of the pre-CAFA settlement standards is a crucial missed opportunity to ratchet up scrutiny of coupon
settlements that may evade the relatively crude attorney’s fees market
mechanism. Congress could have and should have provided more
specific guidance to district courts in reviewing coupon settlements so
as to provide a far more effective basis to rein in abuse.
Moreover, despite academic and political assertions that judicial
review of proposed settlements in federal fora is perfectly sufficient to
241
protect class members, other scholars paint a more ominous picture. For example, Professor Christopher Leslie argues that on the
whole, both federal and state judges are guilty of the same improper
242
He argues that judiapproval of inequitable coupon settlements.
cial ratification of unfair settlements crafted by the adversarial parties
243
is caused by a number of systemic and external factors.
First, the
lack of a well-defined standard for “fair, reasonable, and adequate”
244
Second, proposed coupon settleencourages inconsistent review.
245
ments are surrounded by “coupon noise,” which makes it extremely
difficult for judges to accurately determine the true value of the set246
This inherent difficulty makes an approval of an unfair
tlement.
247
settlement more likely.
Third, systemic pressures, such as an overwhelming desire to produce a settlement and unnecessary deference
240

S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 14 (2005).
See supra notes 233–41 and accompanying text.
242
Leslie, supra note 76, at 1054–55 (discussing Rule 23(e) and judicial presumption of coupon settlement adequacy).
243
Id. at 1053–70.
244
Id. at 1054–55. Professor Leslie discusses courts’ interpretations of process and
substantive review requirements, noting that notwithstanding these construals, courts
often simply presume adequacy. Id. (discussing In re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-up
Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 796 (3d Cir. 1995); City of Detroit v.
Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448, 463 (2d Cir. 1974); In re Domestic Air Transp. Antitrust
Litig., 148 F.R.D. 297, 312 (N.D. Ga. 1993)).
245
Id. at 1055–56. For example, such coupon noise includes red herrings created
by class counsel and the defendant which make the settlement look more valuable.
Id. at 1059.
246
Id. at 1055.
247
See id.
241
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to class counsel, leads to judicial trepidation for rejecting unjust set248
tlements. Finally, he argues that judges often consider certain casespecific factors, such as a defendant’s weak financial position, in justi249
fying approval of the proposed coupon settlement. Professor Leslie
concludes his analysis by asserting that “[u]ltimately, judicial review
of a proposed coupon-based settlement provides insufficient protection to the class against collusion between the defendant and class
counsel. Courts generally rubber-stamp proposed settlements, so bad
250
There is simply no insettlements often survive judicial scrutiny.”
dication that Professor Leslie’s pre-CAFA concerns will not continue
to manifest themselves unabated without stronger statutory protection.
Another scholar, Professor Carol Buckner, maintains similar
251
She argues
criticisms of judicial review of class action settlements.
that judges in both federal and state fora often give only “perfunctory
review” of coupon settlements, resulting in inadequate protection of
252
Furthermore, in order to clear crowded
absent class members.
dockets, the judges ignore self-dealing and approve proposed settlements without any real inquiry into the actual valuation of the cou253
Professor Buckner continues her critique of inpon settlement.
adequate settlement review by arguing that judges pay even less
attention in the settlement context than they do in certifying a class
254
action.
Both sides to the current debate seem to be fairly meritorious.
However, even conceding the fact that federal judges are more likely
than their state court counterparts to closely scrutinize and reject a
substantively unfair proposed coupon settlement does not rectify the
underlying problem: the standard under § 1712(e) is simply not
248

Leslie, supra note 76, at 1060–66.
Id. at 1067–68.
250
Id. at 1070. Professor Leslie discusses In re General Motors Corp. Pick-up Truck
Fuel Tank Products Liability Litigation, 55 F.3d 768, 818 (3d Cir. 1995). In that case,
the district court approved a wholly inequitable coupon settlement that gave class
members a coupon toward a future purchase of a GM vehicle. Id. Professor Leslie
uses this case as a typical example of a situation in which a federal district judge approved an unjust coupon settlement. Id. at 1069.
251
See Buckner, supra note 25, at 201.
252
Id.
253
Id.
254
Id. at 202; see also Mullenix, supra note 25, at 1716–17 (“[N]either the parties
nor the court has [any] special interest in extensively probing adequacy in the settlement context, even in the shadow of a potential collateral attack” because typically,
“the parties are aligned in interest in obtaining the court's approval of the settlement.”).
249
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strong enough to filter out many inequitable coupon settlements or
to provide guidance to federal courts so that they can make a more
255
specific assessment of the propriety of the proposed settlement.
256
Given the jurisdictional expansion of CAFA, even more interstate
class actions will end up in federal court, thereby increasing the likelihood of proposed coupon settlements and clogging federal judges’
dockets (more so than the current federal backlog). This will result
in added pressure on federal judges to dispose of cases by approving
settlements to which the adversaries have already agreed. As a result,
even if federal judges were more inclined than state court judges to
reject unfair pre-CAFA coupon settlements, they will be much more
likely today to approve such settlement proposals. Congress did not
have the foresight to prevent this practical reality from occurring. At
the very least, it is unclear whether federal judges are likely to ratify
unfair coupon settlements, precisely because most of the unfair coupon settlements were being approved in state court before CAFA’s
passage. Because of this, a stricter scrutiny standard should have
been incorporated into the legislation to protect the continued viability of the American class action mechanism.
As an intriguing counterpoint, Professor Coffee believes that
“any system that depends upon extraordinary vigilance by judges is
inferior to one that by structural redesign minimizes the existing in257
centives for collusion.” While this contention is certainly colorable
on a theoretical level, his vision for a utopian class action system in
which class counsel have minimal countervailing economic incen258
tives has yet to come to fruition. As a practical matter, heightened
judicial scrutiny is both necessary and appropriate to provide sufficient redress to the current problem. As Coffee acknowledges,
“[a]lthough courts have long recognized th[e] danger [of collusive
settlement practices] and have developed some procedural safeguards intended to prevent [such] settlements, these reforms are far
259
Rather than redesigning the entire
from adequate to the task.”
class action framework, a more sensible solution to the Coupon Settlement Problem would be to devise a procedural safeguard that actually works. As this Comment argues, enacting a more rigorous judicial review provision would do just that.
255

See supra notes 69–85 and accompanying text.
Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 §§ 4–5, 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1332(d), 1453 (West
2007); see Part III.A, supra.
257
Coffee, supra note 48, at 237.
258
See supra notes 48–68 and accompanying text.
259
Coffee, supra note 214, at 714.
256
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By focusing almost entirely on attorney’s fees-based solutions,
CAFA does not solve the underlying problem: absent class members
with legitimate claims will continue to walk away with coupons that
provide little or no benefit to them, while providing large (though
CAFA-limited) fees to class counsel. Furthermore, defendants will
still retain the ability to easily escape liability, often without the incentive to change wrongful or tortious behavior. Indeed, one commentator maintains that “it is unlikely that anything in CAFA will seriously
curtail the use of coupon settlements. . . . The substantive provisions
260
barely change current practice.”
Under the current scrutiny
scheme, judges may well continue to rubber stamp proposed coupon
settlements, and CAFA will not have lived up to its name. Therefore,
the judicial scrutiny standard should be strengthened to guarantee
substantive relief to class members.
V. PROPOSAL FOR REFORM
A. Rebuttable Presumption Against Coupon Settlements
Given the inadequate provision for proper judicial review of
261
proposed coupon settlements, CAFA should be amended to reformulate the test for judicial review of proposed coupon settlements.
262
Given the history of abuse and unwarranted judicial approval of inequitable coupon settlements, an amendment to CAFA would pro263
Specifically,
vide a uniform and efficient solution to the problem.
CAFA should be amended to provide a two-prong test that presumptively invalidates all coupon settlements, absent a showing of a bona
fide rationale for utilizing such a solution, and that the particular settlement proposal does in fact provide adequate relief to absent class
members.
The first prong would integrate an initial rebuttable presumption against all coupon settlements. By presumptively invalidating
every such proposed settlement, the American class action system will
realize two improvements. First, far fewer coupon settlements will be
proposed at all, increasing the likelihood that money damages or
260

Rubenstein, supra note 13, at 17. Professor Rubenstein does not address the
judicial scrutiny provision of CAFA, but merely contends in conclusory terms that
parties will continue to construct coupon settlements. Id.
261
See supra Part II.B.
262
See supra Part II.B.
263
While a legislative amendment to CAFA would provide for more certain and
uniform outcomes, federal judges could conceivably interpret the already codified
terms of the Act to incorporate the test proposed in this Comment. A policy debate
about which method is preferable, however, is outside the scope of this Comment.
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some tangible benefit will accrue to class members (or that nonmeritorious claims will not be brought in the first place). Second,
because most often coupon settlements occur in a context in which
264
the claim is either dubious or at least not likely to win at trial, the
presumption will naturally encourage defendants to litigate claims
that they are likely to win. In other words, if because of the presumption against coupon settlements, class counsel and defendants cannot
structure such a settlement in an unmeritorious case, defendants will
be more likely to contest ill-founded claims, thus dissuading class
counsel from bringing such claims.
265
While not “strict in theory, fatal in fact,” overcoming the presumption against coupon settlements should be an exceptionally difficult task. Given the concerns precipitating CAFA’s coupon settle266
ment section, only those proposed settlements in which there is a
fundamentally sound rationale for instituting coupons in lieu of
money damages should judges even consider upholding the settlement. Such instances might include situations where the class members’ injuries are so small that a coupon would actually be more helpful to individual class members than mere pennies in damages, or
when a class is so large that economies of scale shrink the costs of
producing coupons to an amount that is theoretically beneficial to
the collective parties involved. Under this “sound rationale” inquiry,
both class counsel and defendant must prove to the court that, in the
abstract, a coupon settlement would be more advantageous to both
the defendants and the plaintiff class than a simple cash award.
Once the class counsel and defendant have collectively convinced the district judge that the high presumptive hurdle has been
overcome, a case-specific substantive prong must be met. This prong
would be in line with the current mandate of § 1712(e), but would
provide a more specific directive to district judges. Under this component of the test, the parties involved must prove to the judge that
the particular coupon settlement proposal is structured in a way that
264

See Hantler & Norton, supra note 11, at 1354–56 (discussing that more and
more defendants have begun taking a stand against unmeritorious class action lawsuits).
265
Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 362 (1978) (discussing strict
scrutiny in the Equal Protection context). This Comment’s proposal does not suggest importation of “strict scrutiny” as an analogue to constitutional review standards,
but for descriptive purposes refers to the proposed test as implementing “strict” or
“stricter” scrutiny over proposed coupons settlements. See Leslie, supra note 76, at
1077–81 (utilizing the phrase “strict scrutiny” in reference to more demanding judicial review of proposed coupon settlements); see also infra notes 269–73 and accompanying text.
266
See supra Parts III.B, IV.
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is actually beneficial to individual class members. Factors to be considered could include the relative benefit to class members compared
to the harm alleged; the absolute dollar value (in coupons) that individual class members would receive; the existence of any secondary
market for such a coupon offering; the amount of use restrictions on
the coupons; and the existence of limitations on redeeming the cou267
pons, among others. A district court should approve the settlement
only if the parties overcome the presumptive hurdle and demonstrate
that (1) the coupon settlement at issue is theoretically a better tool
than money damages in this instance and (2) the particular coupon
offering actually benefits individual class members.
This strict scrutiny test is grounded in theory. Professor Leslie
endorsed stricter judicial scrutiny of proposed coupon settlements
268
prior to the enactment of CAFA.
By compelling district judges to
take a microscopic look at a coupon settlement proposal, the pro269
posed test would manifest three distinct advantages.
First, “strict
scrutiny of coupon terms is a more precise tool than a uniform rejec270
tion of coupon settlements.”
Second, enhanced scrutiny of a coupon settlement would not drastically change what reviewing judges
are theoretically supposed to do—that is, take a close look at the fair271
Third, Professor Leslie argued
ness of the settlement to the class.
267

See, e.g., Girsh v. Jepson, 521 F.2d 153, 157 (3d Cir. 1975). The U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit has adopted a nine-factor test for reviewing the adequacy of a proposed coupon settlement:
(1) the complexity and duration of the litigation; (2) the reaction of
the class to the settlement; (3) the stage of the proceedings; (4) the
risks of establishing liability; (5) the risks of establishing damages; (6)
the risks of maintaining a class action; (7) the ability of the defendants
to withstand a greater judgment; (8) the range of reasonableness of the
settlement in light of the best recovery; and (9) the range of reasonableness of the settlement in light of all the attendant risks of litigation.
Id.; see also In re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55
F.3d 768, 806–18 (3d Cir. 1995) (analyzing a district court’s approval of a coupon
settlement). A plausible argument can be made that the Third Circuit test is sufficient to ensure adequate review of proposed coupon settlements, thus rendering the
presumptive invalidity of coupon settlements suggested by this Comment unnecessary. However, given the concerns of the Coupon Settlement Problem analyzed in
Part III.B, supra, the Third Circuit’s nine-factor test would be put to better use in conjunction with this Comment’s proposed solution. In other words, the Third Circuit
test should only be incorporated once the first prong of the proposed test—
presumption of invalidity—has been satisfied.
268
Leslie, supra note 76, at 1077–81.
269
Id. at 1078–79.
270
Id. at 1078.
271
Id.; see, e.g., Reynolds v. Benefit Nat'l Bank, 288 F.3d 277, 279 (7th Cir. 2002)
(The “[d]istrict judge in the settlement phase of a class action suit [is] a fiduciary of
the class, who is subject therefore to the high duty of care that the law requires of fi-
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that mandating higher judicial scrutiny would induce judges to take a
more proactive approach to the structuring of a fair coupon settle272
ment.
273
This test is not merely the current rule turned on its head.
While the second substantive prong of the test reflects a more specific
application of the fairness inquiry that is supposed to be utilized in
current § 1712(e) fairness hearings, the strong rebuttable presumption against approval in the first prong of the proposed test would
create a judicial strainer that will enhance the fundamental fairness
of the class action system. The proposed test recognizes that “no one
274
But it also
can fairly argue that all coupon settlements are bad.”
understands that, given the history of the coupon settlement mecha275
nism, the majority of coupon settlements inherently work to the
disadvantage of the individual class members, particularly absent class
276
members.
The practicality and efficacy of this Comment’s proposal is best
demonstrated by applying it to a real-life case in which a coupon settlement could have been implemented to the advantage of all parties
277
involved in the action. Shields v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. is such a
case. While the Senate Judiciary Committee decried Shields as a typi278
cal example of abusive coupon settlement practices, in fact no cou279
However, coupons could plaupons were ever proposed or issued.
sibly have been offered to absent class members to provide them
genuine substantive relief that had not yet caused them harm. Simultaneously, Firestone would have procured global relief and been enticed to repair its quasi-tortious conduct.

duciaries.”). This Comment’s proposed test adds to Professor Leslie’s analysis by
providing a more systematic analytical framework for reviewing the merits of a settlement, rather than suggesting “stricter scrutiny” in passing without proposing a
concrete process for implementing such scrutiny. See Leslie, supra note 76, at
1077–81.
272
Leslie, supra note 76, at 1079–80.
273
See supra Part II.B.
274
Lisa M. Mezzetti & Whitney R. Case, The Use of “Coupon” and Other Non-Monetary
Redress in Class Action Settlements, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1431, 1437 (2005).
275
See supra Part II.B.
276
See Tharin & Blockovich, supra note 93, at 1449.
277
No. E-0167637 (Tex. Dist. Ct. 31, 2002); see supra notes 135–36 and accompanying text.
278
See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
279
See supra notes 135–36 and accompanying text. In lieu of coupons, Firestone
agreed to revamp its tire designs and to develop a consumer education and awareness campaign.
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To overcome the presumption against coupon settlements and
satisfy the first prong of this Comment’s proposed test, class counsel
and Firestone attorneys could have successfully illustrated to the trial
judge that there was, in fact, a bona fide rationale for using coupons
as relief instead of individual cash awards. First, awarding cash in a
case where actual damages were prospective (as opposed to retrospective relief for harm that had already been incurred) would not
guarantee that absent class members would actually utilize their
award to remedy the problem. In other words, in Shields, the problem was faulty tires; awarding cash to plaintiffs that had not yet been
injured would not necessarily result in the replacement of that defective product. Coupons, by contrast, would have ensured a solution to
the problem that sparked the litigation in the first place by mandating new tires be purchased with coupons, and thus removing the unsafe product from the market. Second, the potentially large substantive value accruing to class members by providing a means to procure
replacement tires very well may substantially outweigh any individual
cash award. Due to the size of a nationwide class, a cash settlement
would likely only provide a few dollars in relief, whereas a coupon
could have provided a larger value (both in terms of dollar amount
280
and peace of mind) to individual class members. Finally, the
economies of scale of producing coupons for a large class could have
allowed Firestone to adequately compensate class members while at
281
the same time avoiding a more wallet-damaging cash settlement. In
sum, Shields provides an ideal example for a theoretically sound justification for using coupons instead of cash to compensate class members, thus overcoming the presumption against coupon settlements
that this Comment suggests.
Once Firestone and class counsel convinced the trial judge that
coupons were theoretically more beneficial to class members than a
money award, structuring a specific coupon settlement would have
been a relatively simple task. For example, suppose a single faulty tire
cost sixty dollars. Structuring a coupon worth fifteen dollars off the
purchase of a new tire (guaranteed to be safe thanks to Firestone’s
282
promise to perform a full review of its tire design) may well have
provided class members adequate substantive relief in relation to the

280

“Peace of mind” in this context refers to the relief felt when a consumer knows
that her faulty tires were replaced with safe tires.
281
See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
282
Firestone agreed to redesign the tires as part of the actual settlements. Shields,
No. E-0167637 (Tex. Dist. Ct. July 31, 2002); see supra note 135 and accompanying
text.
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harm alleged. Furthermore, the coupon offering could have been
structured so as to allow recipients to aggregate multiple coupons
depending on how many faulty tires they had purchased.
Obviously, the attractiveness of any particular coupon settlement
under this test would depend on the precise terms and limitations, if
any, of the settlement agreement, but the point is simple: in those
situations where coupons can help provide fair relief more effectively
than a cash settlement, the structuring of the actual settlement is
relatively straightforward. Here, where a nationwide class owns a potentially harmful product that has not yet generated any actual damage, coupons that induce those plaintiffs to replace the product at a
sufficiently reduced price would provide the most effective solution.
Under the right settlement structure, a coupon settlement could provide a more effective solution than a cash settlement because, under
the tire hypothetical, the injured class members are now in need of
new tires. By forcing the defendant to fix the problem, and by allowing the plaintiffs to get what they wanted in the first place, everyone is
better off. Furthermore, allocating a settlement with coupons instead
of cash could protect a relatively less culpable defendant from grievous economic harm by allowing for product discounts rather than
massive damage awards, yet still compensating plaintiffs for their injuries. The specifics of a settlement would be worked out on a caseby-case basis, and if adequate under the second prong of the test, the
reviewing court could certify the settlement under CAFA. Running
Shields through this Comment’s proposed gauntlet shows that CAFA
can indeed accomplish its objectives by adjusting the standard of review for proposed coupon settlements.
A congressional amendment to CAFA incorporating this test
would best fix the inadequacies of the current Act. Given the historical abuse of the class action system through use of the coupon set283
tlement mechanism, in addition to the predisposition of judges to
284
summarily accept a proposed settlement, the text of the Act should
expressly mandate that reviewing judges initially presume a coupon
settlement to be inadequate, absent a showing that a coupon offering
could be more beneficial to the class, and that such a settlement actually achieves fundamental fairness. A congressional amendment
would provide consistent and uniform assessment of proposed cou285
pon settlements.
283

See supra Part II.B.
See supra Part III.B.
285
While a legislative amendment to correct the Act’s deficiencies would provide
an effective and uniform result, in the absence of congressional action pursuant to
284
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B. Other Proposed Solutions
Three competing solutions exist to solve inadequate review of
coupon settlements. First, CAFA could be amended to ban all cou286
pon settlements outright.
However, this solution can be rapidly
dispelled because such a drastic reform disregards the possibility of a
287
fundamentally fair coupon settlement.
Second, judges could re288
quire a minimum coupon redemption rate. However, this proposal
is an ineffective tool because
[a]ny solution that relies on manipulating the defendants’ incentive to increase redemption rates will run into the problem of
countervailing incentive. Defendants still have a baseline incentive to insure that settlement coupons do not confer value to the
class at the defendants’ expense. High redemption rates are not
289
necessarily synonymous with valuable coupons.

Finally, an interesting proposal to reform coupon settlement
abuse is to mandate attorney’s compensation to be in the same form
290
as the relief individual class members receive.
While this proposal
would truly align class counsel’s incentives with those of class members, it would likely do so to the point of overkill—even if coupons
were valuable to class members, a million coupons would likely not
be of value to class counsel. In other words, even if the coupons are
of high value and class counsel could conceivably resell them on the
open market, this proposed solution does not provide an efficient
outcome. In most instances, the limited value of the coupon would
render the transaction costs prohibitive—the attorney would lack the
ability to realize the full value of the coupon compensation. The test
proposed in this Comment more practically provides substantive
value to class members in the first instance, instead of an inefficient
and likely unworkable market incentive for attorneys to maximize
their compensation.
The proposal in this Comment would serve to equip federal district judges reviewing proposed coupon settlements with a practical
this Comment’s proposed test, courts could and should develop interpretations of
CAFA’s “fair, reasonable, and adequate” standard that integrate this Comment’s
proposal.
286
Leslie, supra note 76, at 1075–77.
287
Tharin & Blockovich, supra note 93, at 1445. As presented in Part II.A, supra,
the benefits of a fair coupon settlement include the provision of redress from injury,
incentives to correct allegedly wrongful or tortious behavior, and the presentment of
global peace avoiding duplicative litigation, among others.
288
Leslie, supra note 76, at 1081.
289
Id. at 1083.
290
Id. at 1086.
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tool that would help the Class Action Fairness Act achieve its stated
291
By initially mandating a strong rebuttable presumption
purpose.
against coupon settlements, abuse that has enveloped the class action
292
landscape will be curtailed by an Act that has the potential to provide actual substantive relief to absent class members.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 has laudable intentions.
Due to significant abuses of the class action mechanism throughout
293
the 1990s, potential litigants who had been legitimately harmed
294
With the proliferation of the couwere denied appropriate relief.
pon settlement, class counsel and defendants took home all the benefits, leaving the harmed class members with close to nothing, thus
diminishing the effectiveness of and appreciation for the American
295
judicial system.
CAFA was designed to rectify the exploitation of a
procedural mechanism that, when used properly, can provide valuable relief to aggrieved individuals that would not otherwise have the
296
opportunity to litigate their claims. However, the Act does not go
297
By mere reincantation of the same ineffective prefar enough.
CAFA standard, the Act will allow unscrupulous attorneys to weave
their way around the Act, and in the end, class members will continue
298
By amending the Act to
to be left holding the bag (of coupons).
presumptively bar all coupon settlements, only the fair and just settlements that provide real substantive value to absent class members
299
As President Bush acknowlwill make it through the judicial filter.
300
edged, the Act has begun to make progress. However, “there’s still
301
more [work] to do.”
This work should come in the form of an
overhaul of the judicial fairness inquiry over proposed coupon settlements. As a result, CAFA would provide a more successful funda-

291

See supra notes 2–8 and accompanying text.
See supra Part II.B.
293
See id.
294
See id.
295
See id.
296
See supra Part III.
297
See supra Part IV.
298
See supra Part IV.B.
299
See supra Part V.
300
Press Release, Office of the White House Press Sec’y, President Signs ClassAction Fairness Act of 2005 (Feb. 18, 2005), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/
news/releases/2005/02/20050218-11.html.
301
Id.
292
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mental guarantee of actual substantive relief to absent class members,
thus achieving its commendable objectives.

